Europe 1992: The forming of a single market with special emphasis on the role of the Germanys by Smith, Melanie
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
M u k y A 19  T t r
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
HdMi£ AwaWik
ENTITLED...C.VEus+pt,JtUUk......
b l C t n ^ M A f - f
IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF. ..$ o x f o * l * r ' ...* £ . A t - t e .
v m
, & .........Approved: .A, U 1  (
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF
0*1264
Europe 1992
The Forming o f a Single Market with Special 
Emphasis on the Role o f the Germany!
By
Melanie Smith
t
Thesis 
for the
Degree o f Bachelor o f Arts
in
Liberal Arts and Sciences
College o f Liberal Arts and Sciences 
University o f Illinois 
Urbane, Illinois
1990
Table o f Contents
Deutsche Zusam m enflusung...........................................................................................................  1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3
PsurtI: History o f the European Community ............................................................................  4
Pert II: The Road to a Common M a rk e t............................................................................ ......  12
Part m : Progress Since 1985 and Selected Expert O p in io n s...................................................21
Part rtf: Analytical Fram ew ork...............................................................................................26
Part V: The German C oncentration.................................................................................................33
B ib liog raphy ..................................................................................................................................... .....
iii
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Albeit handelt vor der Europftischen Gemeinschaft. 1992 wollen die 
Mitgliedsstaaten einen gemeinsamen Markt bilden, ein Vorhaben, das unter dem Nanten “Europe 
1992” bekannt ist. Es handelt sich urn einen dynamischen und ehrgeizigen n a n , denn ein 
gemeinsamer Markt ist nicht leicht zu erreiclnm. Es dauert viele Jahie. Die europlische 
Integration ist ein komplizierter ProzeS. Ost-Europa befindet sich auf dem Weg zur Demokratie. 
Es ist noch ungewiB, welche Auswirkung diese Entwicklung auf die EG haben wild. Von 
besonderem Interesse ist die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands. Sie scheint vor der TQr zu stehen, 
und viele fragen sich, was das fhr die EG und Deutschland bedeuten wird. Ich habe versucht, 
den IntegradonsprozeB und die Auswirkungen der Entwicklungen im Often in meiner Arbeit zu 
behandeln.
Die Arbeit besteht aus fbnf Teilen. Der erste befaBt sich mit der «3eschichte der EG. 
Dieser Teil ist wichtig, da er die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft aufzeigt, was fUr ein Verstindnis 
der gegenw&rtigen Eieignisse notwendig ist. “Europe 1992” ist kein neues Ziel. Im Jahre 1983 
hat die Kommission bestimmt, da£ die EG-Staaten etwas tun mQSten, um den IntegrationsprozeB 
voranzutreiben. Das war der offizielle Ausgangspunkt fOr “Europe 1992” , fOr Ziele, die zum 
GroBteil schon in den Vertrftgen von Rom definiert wurden.
Der zweite und dritte Teil der Arbeit befaBt sich mit den Fortschritten, die seit 1983 
gemacht wurden. Dabei wird auf die Institutionen der Gemeinschaft und deren Funktionen 
eingegangen. Anhand von Beispielen werden die Handelsbarrieren innerhalb der EG aufgezeigt,
1
2die sowohl technischer, physischer ah  auch fiskalischer Natur sind.
Der vierte Teil der Albeit befaflt sich mit den volkswirtschaftlichen BeweggrOnden fOr 
die europiische Integration. Anhand von Schaubildem and Tabellen werden die wirtschafflichen 
Auswirkungen des Integrationsprozesses erlftutert und die Vorteile fQr die Mitgliedsstaaten 
herausgestrichen.
Der letzte Teil befaBt sich mit Deutschland, einem der wichtigsten M itgliedsllnder der 
EO. Die DM ist eine der hiitesten Wfthrungen, deutsche Produkte und Dienstieistungen sind 
weltweit gefragt, und die Handelsbilanz der BRD ist schon seit Jahren positiv. Niemand kann 
genau vorhersagen, was passieren wird. Der Okonomische Wandel in der DDR wird sowohl fQr 
die DDR als auch fQr die BRD viele Probleme mit sich brirgen, egal ob es zu einer 
W iedervereinigung kommt Oder nicht. Anhand von Medienberichten wird versucht, die 
mdglichen Auswirkungen auf BRD, DDR und die EO zu erliutern.
Introduction
This thesis will pull several sources together in an effort to paint a somewhat detailed 
picture. The picture will entail the history leading to the current European Community, the 
plans for economic integration, the possible benefits and problems of such integration, and finally 
how this all ties in with the current attempts of West Germany to reunite with its pre-1945 eastern 
counterpart.
A timeline has been constructed, dividing the thesis into five parts. Parts I through III 
explain the history o f the Community, the plans for progressive movements toward a common 
market and the opinions and effects o f progress made since 1985. Part IV shifts to an analytical 
framework, to complement the theories presented in Parts I through III. Part V is a necessary 
supplement to this thesis. This port focuses upon one Member Country, W est Germany, and uses 
very recent publications to explain the current movements toward reunification with East 
Germany. The tie in to the previous four ports is how this integration will affect Germany in 
light of the common market plans.
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Part I: History o f the European Community
After the Second World W ar, Europe was in state o f despair, with the poverty and rubble 
left from the war. Europe faced a huge challenge; it had to pull itself up from an economic, 
political, and social disaster. In order for the Europeans to rebuild, they needed to rid themselves 
of the $24.4 billion debt*. With Stalins' armies surrounding W eucm  Europe, America quickly 
responded to the European cry for aid with the European Recovery Act (The Marshall Plan). 
The European Recovery Act was a rush o f massive aid to Europe in the form of gifts and low 
interest loans which together equaled approximately $22 billion. America supported the nations 
of Western Europe in working toward a democratic union.
It was shortly thereafter, on March 9 , 1930 that Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet 
proposed the formation o f the European Coal and Steel Community. This proposal was open to 
all countries o f Europe, but only six joined in the beginning. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was to be directed by a European institution called the High Authority. In 
addition to this High Authority, the founders initiated a Council o f Ministers, a Court o f Justice 
and a Parliamentary Assembly2. These institutions foreshadowed the institutions o f the modem 
European Communities and will be discussed in further detail later.The purpose o f this unity was 
to increase production and consumption o f cod  and steel to help promote higher levels of welfare *3
*Dr. W erner Baer, lecture, International Economic History, 13 Feb. 1990.
3Office o f Official Publications o f the European Communities, Steps to Bump—» Unity 
(Luxembourg: 1987) 11-12.
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5to the people of the six nations. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is often 
referred to as the foundation o f the European Communities as we know 'hem today. Of course, 
the United States was fully supportive o f this organization for it developed a democratic strength 
in Europe, where communism, America feared, would remain a bitter foe.
The ECSC treaty was signed in Paris on April 18, 1931 by the following countries: 
France, the Fedeial Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg.
The 6 nations o f the Community delegated a part o.' their sovereignty to the High 
Authority which made decisions in the common interest o f the Member States*. The 6 Member 
States also attempted to form an integrated defense community. They had hopes of integrating 
political policies. Although the excitement for a unified Europe was great, an integrated defense 
community failed quickly. The Community needed to begin integration from an economic 
standpoint. Thus, the European unification process continued.
Under the leadership of Belgian statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak, a committee was set up to 
research and report the effects of economic union and nuclear energy union. After the approval 
o f this report in May 1936, the negotiations were underway, and the six members began to work
out the plans for the two additions to the European Coal and Steel Community: The European 
Economic Community and The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Treaties 
of Rome, signed on March 23, 1937, confirmed the establishment o f the EEC and Euratom. 
These new treaties, coupled with the ECSC’s Treaty o f Paris make up the constitution o f the
^O fficial Publications, Steps 10-13.
6European Community. This “three part constitution” has common goals in the forefront: to 
promote economic expansion and increase standards o f living, accompanied by political union 
o f the peoples o f Europe*.
Although the objectives o f the Economic Community set guidelines for the eventual 
emergence o f a  common market and European unity, the immediate goal o f the 6 Member States 
was the establishment of a customs union. These points are best understood through examination 
o f the Treaty o f Rome. The Treaty of Rome states in Article 2 that an objective o f the European
Economic Community is to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it. These 
objectives will be achieved by the creation o f a single internal market free o f restrictions on the 
movement of goods, the abolition o f obstacles to the free movement o f persons, services and 
capital, the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted, the approximation of laws as required for the proper functioning o f the common market 
and the approximation of indirect taxation in the interest of the common market. All these 
objectives will be realized by the application o f two sets o f policies, those taken in common at 
the level o f the EC and those taken individually by the member states but in coordination with 
each other. With the establishment o f the common market, common policies will be specifically
^O fficial Publications, Steps 18.
7inaugurated in commerce, agriculture, and transport*.
The third Article o f the Treaty incorporates movements toward the abolition o f customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions for all commodities and services between Member States. The 
third Article also calls for a common commercial policy and common customs tariffs on imports 
from non-member countries.
The previous short examination o f the Treaty shows the immense plans that the original 
six countries had in mind when they drew up the foundation for the European Economic 
Community. After the Treaty negotiations, it took about one year to begin cutting customs duties 
between Member State trading. The EEC set up a timetable to abolish customs duties. 
Concurrently, an external customs duty was established. The immediate effects o f free trade 
were felt by the Member States and envied by non-Members. Already in 1959 Turkey and 
Greece applied for admission.
Through the 1960’s there were some difficulties between France and the rest of the 
Community about how and when to enlarge the Community of six. However, during the i960's 
several steps were taken to promote the growth and success of the Community. First, there was 
the establishment o f the Common Agricultural Policy. Although it was very controversial the 
main goal was to introduce common agricultural prices and support them through variable levies 
in hopes of promoting and ensuring a siiong agricultural base for the Community. The 
Community also began to sign non-Member trade agreements with several African nations as well
^Treaty o f Rome, as quoted in H itiris, T ., European Community Economics. A Modern 
Introduction (Great Britain: Harvester 1988) 34-36.
8as Iran in 1963. This was objectionable from the side of the United States for they felt as if  they 
were being put at a disadvantage. Nonetheless this was proof of the growing strength of the 
Economic Community for they were increasing their trade relations to a higher global degree.
In 1967 the European Community established a Single Council and Single Commission 
for all the Communities. From this point on there was only the Commission and Council 
(replacing the ECSC High Authority and the separate EEC and Euratom Commissions). 1968 
was a grand year for the Community for it was the year of the completion o f the Customs Union. 
All customs were removed between the Member States, and the external tariff was finally set up.
1969 marked the year o f the Hague Summit where the governors of central banks met 
to discuss monetary problems. Most would view the Hague Summit as a  step forward for the 
Community because it called for monetary and economic union, although these goals still have 
not been achieved.The Hague Summit can be viewed as a successful summit because it 
strengthened the European Community Institutions by calling for common monetary policies. As 
stated in an official publication o f the European Communities, on page 33,
Under this new system [established at the Hague Summit] 
the Community will receive all customs duties on products 
imported from non-Member countries, levies on agricultural 
products and resources derived from V A T's calculated by a 
rate o f up to 1% to a uniform base.6
The strengthening o f the Economic Community set the stage for the addition o f three new
6 O fficial Publications, S i m  33.
9members which were added in 1972 and officially became members in 1973. These countries 
were Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. There was still a great hope for a  full union 
but these hopes were somewhat forgotten when, a  crisis arose from the collapse o f the Bretton 
Woods System. This led to a crisis within the EC which was seen throughout the 1970's. The EC 
could not decide on common economic policies and each nation simply acted independently of 
the others. The U.S. could no longer support the gold price and went off the system, and 
jeopardized the parity equilibrium o f most western currencies.7
After the monetary crisis o f 1971-1973, the oil crisis o f 1973 caused several EC Member 
States to turn toward the United States for guidance. The countries o f OPEC quadrupled die 
price of oil. The direct economic impact was a  huge price increase in manufactured products. 
The Member States' balances o f payments were thrown into disequilibrium. Again the 
Economic Community could not agree upon a common policy. The monetary crisis and OPEC 
embargo together with failure to agree upon common policies to deal with these crises caused the 
seventies to be a bleak period fbr the Community.
Although the seventies were bleak, the long term goals o f the Community were not 
forgotten. Several events happened during this period which make the European Community the 
competitive economic region that it is today. Between 1975 and 1977 three countries applied for 
membership: Greece, Portugal, and Spain4.
7Baer, lecture, 13 Feb. 1990.
^Commission o f The European Communities, A Journey Through the EC. (Luxembourg: 
European Documentation Series M anuscript, 1987) 55.
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Also, in 1979 the Community developed the European Monetary System which included 
four main components as summarized:
—European Currency Unit (ECU)
—An exchange and information mechanism 
—Credit facilities 
—Transfer arrangements9
One of the main functions o f the EMS was to increase the potential of Member States with 
weaker economies.
Several other events occurred during the later seventies to increase development in the 
Community. Relationships were established between the EC and several other countries, leading 
to the policies and standards o f the EC today. These relationships were mainly formed through 
trade agreements. All o f these trade agreements were very important to the Community and 
they set the stage for other agreements of the early 1980's. At this point one can clearly see that 
the EEC was already on a competitive level in the global economy.10
Even though many steps were taken to set the stage for future Community success, the 
downfalls o f the early seventies were harsh enough that many consider the seventies in general 
a dark period in the EEC.
The results o f the dark period were strongly felt by the Member States and drove them 
to look for higher levels o f integration in the 1980's. The EEC found itself left behind in many
^Official Publications, Steps 57. 
^Com m ission, Joumev. 53-60.
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areas o f high technology,which o f course put it in an ‘‘underdog” position in the late seventies 
and early eighties.
One cannot leave the 1970's without acknowledging the Treaty of Accession signed with 
Greece in 1979. The Treaty was went into effect in 1981 and was followed by Treaties of 
Accession signed with Portugal and Spain in 1985.
1985 marks the turning point for the EC because this was the year the EC decided to 
create a single market by 1992.
Europe moved from the ruins of World W ar II and economic disaster to an economic 
power. The establishment o f the European Economic Community and the steps toward economic 
growth helped all Member States toward their common goal o f a prosperous, stable Europe. Part 
two will explain the importance of the European Community's plan for completion o f the internal 
(common) market by 1992. The events leading to Europe 1992 and the expected impact of a 
single market will be discussed.
Part II: The Road to  a  Com mon M arket
Recently, there has been much discussion and concern about 1992 and the completion of 
the internal market in Europe. There are exaggerated conceptions o f just what the year 1992 will 
bring. Foreign competitors are fearful, many Europeans are skeptical, and the general buzzing 
about 1992 has left the whole world wondering whether or not the Europeans are devising a 
“Fortress Europe. ” Certainly, that is not the intent o f the Member States. The intent is to make 
the European Economic Community a competitive world trading partner and to remove the 
barriers that inhibit the Member States from advancing further economically. In short, the goal 
is the creation o f a single European economy based on a common market77. But, although it is 
believed by many to be a new goal, Part I clearly showed that the Treaty o f Rome laid down 
this specific goal in 19S7. The complications during the 1970's and early 1980's of the European 
Communities have left this goal somewhat unattended but not forgotten. In a 1987 Community 
document, called “Europe Without Frontiers-Completing the Internal M arket,” Jacques Delors, 
President o f the Commission of the European Communities sums up the push for the common 
market when he says:
In the world race against the clock which the countries of Europe have to win to survive, 
what was needed was a common objective to enal-le us to look beyond the everyday 
difficulties and pool our strengths and energies. That is why, when I took over as 
President o f the Commission of the European Communities, I proposed to the European 
Parliament and to the Heads of State or Government of the Community that we should 
create by 1992 an economic area where all barriers have been removed and the principles 
of solidarity are applied. The biggest o f its kind in the world, this large market without 
frontiers is an invaluable asset which can help restore our firms to economic health and 
a strong competitive position. It is one of the main driving forces that will take us on to
“ O fficial Publications, F ron tiers 9 .
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European Union. This objective was solemnly adopted by the Community* 72.
Thus, the goal for 1992 is to establish a common market in light o f the goals for future 
European Union.
In light o f this objective, Part II will begin with a brief overview of the European 
Community structure, then move into the events which lead to plans for 1992 and the specific 
steps which will be taken to achieve the desired end o f the Community.
The EC is governed by four major institutions. They are:
—The Council of the European Community 
—The Commission of the European Community 
—The Assembly o r European Parliament 
—The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)
The Council is responsible for enacting legislation. The Assembly as well as ECOSOC are 
consultative institutions. The Council cannot enact legislation without the opinion of the 
consultative bodies. The Commission prepares proposed legislation and presents it to ECOSOC 
and the Assembly, finally presents it to the Council for adoption72.
The judiciary branch is called the European Court o f Justice. This court has the 
jurisdiction over all Community legal affairs. It consists o f thirteen judges and six advocates 
general. The Single European Act has allowed for lower courts to ease the burden of the
720fficial Publications, Frontiers S.
72Price W aterhouse Staff, European Communities Information Guide. (New York: Price 
Waterhouse, 1987) 11-12.
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European Court o f Justice.
The flowchart on the following page shows how the various Institutions cooperate, as set 
forth in the Treaties o f Rome.
15
The Cooperations of the Institutions Created by the Treaty of Rome'*
The
Commission
(APPOINTS* 9 f 
AOPCSMCNT)
14 Paxton, John, The Developing Common Market. 3rd edition (Boulder: 1976)
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As seen on the chart, the Commission has an advisory role. The Commission is also 
responsible for various funds. Again, it is shown that ECOSOC plays an advisory role. The 
Parliament has no legislative power but has a strong influence on the results of the Council 
which has the legislative power. The Court o f Justice is independent. It has courts beneath it 
but they are not shown here.
After presenting a general outline o f the history and structure of the European 
Communities,our focus will move to the integration process: Europe 1992.
By the early 1980's the Commission wanted to raise awareness throughout the Community 
about the lack o f progress toward the creation o f a common market. They wanted the rest of the 
Member States to realize that cumbersome regulations and barriers had to be removed for Europe 
to stay competitive. Following are a few examples to illustrate the complications and 
bureaucratic frustration commonly encountered in intra-community trade.
—A consumer organization estimated that a person traveling through ten member countries 
(excluding Ireland and Luxembourg) and returning to the starting country would end up with only 
53% of the money with which he/she began because of the cost of changing money into local 
currency.
—A European television manufacturer had to make seven types of television sets to meet member 
country standards, which required 70 engineers to adjust new models to individual country 
requirements and cost an additional $20 million per year.
—Because of delays at the borders between member countries, a 750-mile trip from London to
17
Milan took 38 hours, whereas a trip o f equal length within the United Kingdom took 36 hours'5. 
These examples are simply used here to illustrate a point, that the Member States needed to take 
a stand to eliminate the physical, technical, and fiscal barriers.
Several steps were taken in the early 1980's to complete the internal market. Most of 
these early decisions were made by the European Council. These events led to the final decision 
in 1985 to begin a formal plan of action to develop the common market by the end of 1992. 
The Council then called upon the legislative body; the Commission, to draw up a plan of action. 
As cited in the opening comments o f Part II, Jacques Delors, the Commission's President, was 
key in launching the plan for quick integration'*.
The result o f the Council's request was the document entitled, "Completing the Internal 
Market-White Paper from the Commission to the European Council.” The White Paper, as it 
is commonly called, is a proposal o f 300 (later cut down to 279) detailed areas in which the EC 
needs to make improvements in order to achieve a common market. The final date for the 
realization of all proposals is December 31, 1992.
The White Paper is divided into three sections. Each section is devoted to one of the 
barriers, physical, technical, and fiscal, which the Community wishes to abolish.
It is in the introduction o f the actual document where the goals and intentions o f the Community 
are outlined. These goals are not for a completely unified Europe but rather for an internal,
' 5Calingaert, Michael, The 1992 Challenge from Europe; Development gf the EUfPPCj
Community's Internal Market (Washington D .C .: National Flem ing Association, 1987) 4-7.
'*Calingaert, 6-8.
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barrier-free market within the boundaries of Europe. The following is a comment from the 
introduction to the White Paper:
This White Paper is not intended to cover every p o i' ble issue which affects the 
integration of the economies of the Member States of the Community. It focusses on the 
Internal Market and the measures which are directly necessary to achieve a single 
integrated market embracing the 320 million people o f the (enlarged) Community. There 
are many other matters-all of them important in their own way-which bear upon economic 
integration, indirectly affect the achievement of the Internal Market and are the subject 
o f other Community policies77.
The White Paper is generally a review of the state o f the common market in 1985, a 
highlight of the shortcomings, and a timetable o f goals which need to be accomplished by 
Member States in order for the European Community to establish a great internal market by 
1992, and to become more competitive on a world level.
One development which aided in the launching o f the plan for 1992 was the Single 
European Act. The Single European Act was the only major constitutional change and it was 
passed by the EC right after the launching o f the White Paper. The Single European Act was 
a compromise for it called for the elimination o f certain rigid regulations within the Community. 
All Member States agreed on the Single European Act. This compromise opened the way to 
further progress. It extended a qualified majority voting in four fields:
—the creation o f a real internal market by 1992 
—technological research and development 
—economic and social cohesion 7
7 Com m ission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market White Paper 
from the Commission to the European Council (Luxembourg: 1985) 7, #17.
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—improvement o f the working conditions
It also extended the Treaty o f Rome to cover monetary and environmental policy and it increased 
Parliam ent's role in the Community decision making process**.
Certainly, the White Paper leaves out many economic factors that directly affect the 
operation of the market, such as absence o f common currency, lack o f coordination of 
macroeconomic policies, differences in direct taxation, and consumer policies* 9. This will 
undoubtedly affect the movement toward a common market. For now, however, we will briefly 
focus on the specifications and areas o f action indicated in the White Paper,
The first is border controls whose removal would serve many purposes. It would be 
visible evidence of one market. The reason for these border controls are numerous different 
value added taxes, different health policies, different nationalities o f people, drug reinforcement 
and terrorism prevention. But the economic cost caused by these controls adds up to about $10 
billion annually.
Allowing free movement o f people would eliminate one reason for border controls. It 
would also allow for free movement of labor. From a national standpoint however, there are 
many objections to this goal, for the domestic workers may lose employment in certain areas if 
there is free movement o f workers across borders.
The differences in direct taxation regimes receive much attention in the White Paper and 
are believed to bring about trade distortions. As a hypothetical situation, a Danish producer of
**Official Publications, Steps S3.
*9Calingaert, 22.
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a certain good may charge a 3% VAT and a French producer may charge 7%. Assuming that 
all other factors o f production are equal, the consumer would prefer the Danish good over the 
French and there would be a trade distortion. The White Paper calls for the harmonization of 
VAT policies between Member States to avoid these unfair trade distortions. Calling for 
harmonization o f fiscal policies does not mean that the Community will have common policies. 
Harmonization means that the policy makers o f the individual nations will need to work together 
to make their policies coincide. This "harmonization” process is specifically spelled out for the 
Member States in the W hite Paper, not only for fiscal policies, but also for monetary.
The W hite Paper calls for free movement o f capital, and the integration o f services such 
as banking insurance, brokerage, and securities. The estimated gains increase that this integration 
would cause is $26 billion.30
Perhaps the most complex area (of the W hite Paper) is the removal o f technical barriers. 
There are several factors one must take into consideration when dealing with technical standards. 
There are technical standards developed by private bodies, regulations laid down within the legal 
framework o f the individual countries, different testing procedures, and a fair amount o f domestic 
protectionism.
The final large group o f barriers which the White Paper gives great attention to is public 
procurement. It accounts for 10-15% o f the Community ODP. If there were an integration of 
public procurement policies, there would be a  huge reduction o f costs because the procurement 
projects would be given to the lowest bidders, not the national industry. If a subway were to be
^C alingaert, 23.
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built in Belgium, for example, the project could very well be given to an Italian company if its 
price were the most competitive.
The question remains, can Europe actually reach the goal o f establishing a common 
market? The deadline o f 1992 may not be reached, but the date itself is of no importance. 
What is important is that the steps the Member States are taking now to reach the common 
market, and perhaps eventual unity, are irreversible. Each step is a move toward a more united, 
economically stronger Europe.
After the Commission's call for the White Paper in 1985, steps toward a common market 
have begun to move rapidly. Part III will be an up-date o f the Community's progress in working 
within the guidelines o f the White Paper as well as an analysis of a few opinions of the progress 
o f the European Community.
Part III: Progress Since 1983 and Selected Expert Opinions
Since die launching o f “Europe 1992” all Member States have begun information 
campaigns to prepare the populations for the 1992 program. Belgium, for example, has a 
“Secretary o f State Europe 1992” who explains the implications o f the internal market to the 
business community.
Measuring the real progress o f the completion o f the internal market is a very complicated task. 
It goes much further than simply informing the citizens, although that is a very important step. 
The obstacles in the way of completion are extensive. The quantitative guideline which one can 
use as a measuring tool is the W hite Pater. Since the EC Commission's publication o f its White 
Paper in 1983, over half o f the 279 directives were adopted by the EC Council by early 1988**. 
More recently, it was announced in 1989 that only 18% of the directives remained to be passed.
Seemingly, the project is well underway towards a  common market. The opinions about 
the common market are mostly positive. The negative opinions concern the roadblocks 
Community Members will have to face to reach their goal. The following excerpt is taken from 
a lecture by the Prime M inister o f Spain, Felipe Gonzalez (delivered at the European University 
Institute in Florence, October 19,1987). Gonzalez expresses the positive side of integration then 
expresses the negative effects and roadblocks on the way to a common market. His particular 
interest is future European unity.
**Hitiris, European Community Economics. (Great Britain: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988) 
3.
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From my point o f view, the internal market is an essential element in the advance towards 
European unity. You can believe me if I tell you that I am in full agreement with the 
positive nature o f those measures. But you may also believe me if  I say that some regions 
can hardly put up with the cost. Development of the resources of the internal market 
within a  Europe with very marked regional imbalances in income, competitiveness etc, 
logically means the triumph of the stronger over the weaker. A non-modemized 
Portuguese or Spanish industry located in a  region with poor infrastructures is liable to 
be swept aside by competition form a Dutch or German one. In general terms, advances 
in the internal market will mean benefits for technologically advanced firms with a good 
capital structure and developed regional infrastructures22.
The opinion of Gonzalez is that the Community must understand the relationship between 
the internal market and economic/social cohesion or it will not advance toward an integrated 
Europe but rather move to a dual Europe with increasing distances between the strong and the 
weak. This is one of the deep seated problems facing Community Members.
Social cohesion amongst Member citizens is questionable, according to many experts. 
Social integration in light o f common market directives will be a  great challenge to the Member 
States and will be working against thousands o f years o f historical culture.
One o f the most intriguing aspects o f the 1992 plan concerns the effects this project will 
have on Community business and trading partners around the world. The second section o f Part 
III will move from the opinions about moving toward integration to the effects after integration.
The best way to analyze the effects o f integration on Member States' business is to 
examine Paolo Cecchini's report o f the costs o f “non-Europe.” Part II gave a few examples of
22Marques, Felipe Gonzalez, "Europe, from the Community o f twelve to Rumpenn Union- 
The Objective for 1992" (Florence: European University Institute, October 1987) 16-18.
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the barriers involved in the Community which need to be removed. The Cecchini Report is a 
comprehensive study (the only one o f this sort) of the effects o f not having a common market. 
The conclusions o f the Cecchini Report are that completion o f the internal market will result in 
far-reaching gains for the Community-an increase in the Community GDP between 4.5% and 7%, 
an increase in employment by between 2 and 5 million, lowering in consumer prices in the range 
of 4.5% - 6%, a decrease in public budgetary deficits by up to 2% of GDP and an improvement 
of Community external balance by up to 1 % o f GDP. These gains are o f course only potential 
and by no means guaranteed.2,7
Separate studies covering the same topic are summarized on the following chart.
The Cost o f non-Europe24
Custom s form slitlts 12 000 million e c u  
(estimate by the Com m ission 
of ths European Com m unities!
Restrictions on 40 000 million E C U
public contracts (Aibert/Ball report!
Failure to develop inform ation 4 million jobs by around
technology on tha Com m unity 
scale
1 M 0  (McKinsey study!
Failure to double scale of 20*90% o f unit costs
production of m anufactured goods (study by industrial 
economists)
"C ecchin i, Paolo, The European Challenge 1992 (United Kingdom: Wildwood House, 
distributed in the U .S. by Gower Publishing Company, 1988).
"O ffic ia l Publication, Frontiers. 13.
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As illustrated by the Cecchini Report, the effects o f a common market have potential for 
huge gains in Member Countries. Cost will decrease, employment will increase and general 
standard o f living for Community Members will move to a higher level. What does this all 
mean for foreign countries with a large interest in the European Community?
The United States is an excellent example for it has a huge vested interest in the European 
Community. The completion of the common market will give U .S. business a barrier-free market 
for trade with which earlier was 12 separate entities25. With the common market, the United 
States could work within the community as a whole, increasing vastly the market size for a 
particular product. If an American exporter, for example, had been exporting a product to Spain, 
the same exporter could export the product throughout the Community with relative ease. It is 
quite clear, however, that completion of the common market will vastly increase the potential 
competitiveness o f Community firms and perhaps decrease the American competitiveness. 
American competitiveness will be vitally affected in three main areas, regulation o f services, 
standards, and public procurement.
The implications for exporters are dependent upon two factors. One is the amount o f EC 
protectionism and the second is the increase in standards of living which will cause an increase 
in demand for imports within the European Community. Depending on the extent to which the 
EC enforces protectionist measures, the common market will either keep the import level 
approximately equal or else the excess demand will cause imports to increase.
In general, however, it is true that the EC is not trying to build a Fortress Europe. They
^C alingaert, 80.
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are building what they wish to be known as Partner Europe. The common market, once reached, 
is not an attempt at protectionist enclosure, but rather an attempt at putting Europe and its 
products on the level o f the foreign competitors, to rid itself o f unneeded barriers and to fully 
exercise the diverse potential in the Community.
The steps toward integration have moved very quickly. The Member States have worked 
together to follow the measures which have been established in the White Paper. The experts 
agree that the common market will put the EC in an advantageous position. The next step is to 
look at integration from an economists viewpoint. In part IV, we will briefly analyze the 
economic framework o f integration and use a few simple graphs to prove previously stated 
arguments.
Part IV: Analytical Framework
Up until now we have examined the history of the European Community, the steps taken 
to reach the goal of the 1992 project, discussed some expert opinions about the 1992 project, and 
finally, analyzed some important expected effects of the common market. We have discussed 
customs unions and common markets and looked at the advantages of integration for the 
European Community. This section will provide a brief objective summary o f the analytical 
framework behind integration as well as some economic definitions.
We will begin with some definitions o f regional economic associations. These terms can 
best be explained by the following chart36.
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The state o f the European Community before 198S was a customs union as established in 
1968 (see Part I). The goal of 1992 is a common market. The characteristics of the different 
types o f economic regions are briefly outlined in the previous chart.
The process o f integration is not a stable, neat movement from one level to another. 
There arc actually only two stable forms or economic associations. The first is the very minimal 
free trade association and the second is the maximal complete integration. Any other form of 
economic association is only an intermediate stage in the process o f (voluntary) integration27 
Therefore, it is a logical progression for the EC to push toward a common market with hopes of 
achieving an eventual unified Europe.
With the economic definitions sorted out, we can use some simple analytical tools to 
express, through graphs, the benefits of integration. To begin an analytical analysis o f economic 
integration, one must begin with a customs union for, as noted, it is a  beginning step toward 
integration.
The formation o f a customs union causes some products that were formerly produced 
domestically (perhaps in France) to be imported from other member countries (like Germany)- 
the tariffs on such imports were eliminated by the formation o f the customs union. The shift in 
production is from a higher-cost domestic producer to a lower-cost producer in a partner country. 
The result is trade creation. The formation o f the customs union causes some tariff 
discrimination. This means that certain products that were formerly imported from non-member 
countries will be imported from other member countries. The result is often a switch from a low
27Hitiris, 4.
29
cost producer in the rest of the world to a higher cost producer within the customs union. The 
result o f this concept is trade diversion. Thus, an improvement in welfare occurs when trade 
creation outweighs trade diversion2*. These principles of trade creation and trade diversion can 
best be illustrated by the following graphs.
In this graph, country A consumes OQ3, with OQ2 produced by A and Q2Q3 imported 
from B (partner country). After the formation o f the customs union betwen A and B and the 
elimination o f A 's tariff (PT), A 's consumption increases to OQ4, A 's domestic production M s  
to OQ1, A 's imports increase to Q1Q4 and A 's tariff revalue (G1F2F302) disappears. The net 
gain to A is represented by the areas of the two shaded triangles, F1F2G1 (production effect) and
MChachoUades, M iltiades, International Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company, 1990) 229.
30
F3F4G2 (consumption effect).
The following graph shows the what happens with trade diversion.
Here, (before the formation of a customs union) country A consumes OQ3, o f which OQ2 
is produced domestically and Q2Q3 is imported from C (representing the rest o f the world). 
After the formation o f the customs union and the elimination o f A 's tariff on imports ftomB, A 
diverts its purchases from C to B (because O B <O T). A’s consumption increases to OQ4, A 's 
production decreases to OQ1, A 's imports increase to Q1Q4, and A 's tariff revenue (G1H1H2G2) 
vanishes. The two shaded triangles, F1F2G1 and F3F4G2 represent gain. Shaded rectangle 
F2H1H2F3 represents the lo ts from diverting the initial amount o f imports (Q2Q3) from a lower- 
cost source (C) to a higher-cost source (B)2*
"C hacholiadea, 234-33.
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Besides the static effects of trade creation and diversion there are complicated dynamic 
effects o f integration. These effects are increased competition, stimulation o f technical change, 
stimulation o f investment and economies o f scale.
An increase in competition is the effect o f the ability of several companies to move into 
new markets. Since tariffs are removed, the number o f potential competitors is increased. This 
puts a pressure on monopolistic firms and has a tendency to shut down smaller, less efficient 
firms unless they give in to pressures and become more efficient. This entire process leads to 
increased research and development and hence the stimulation of technical change. This will lead 
to an increase in investment.** O f course certain import-competing industries are hard hit by the 
excess competition from the more efficient producers located in other union countries. These 
specific industries will undergo a disinvestment, which must be subtracted from the investment 
mentioned earlier in order to come up with a net positive effect in the customs union.
Creating larger markets like customs unions leads to greater degrees of specialize1 ion 
which results in a  reduction in costs for the following reasons: fuller utilization o f plant capacity, 
learning by doing and development o f a pool of skilled labor and management. What we have 
just described is called an economy of scale. These “economies o f scale” are particularly 
important to countries who are only beginning to develop economically*'.
Since we now have an understanding for moving into a customs union, like die EC did 
in 1968, we can move onward to see the effects of completing the common market projects. The
*°Chacholiades, 236. 
*'Chacholiades, 233-37.
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following chart illustrates the macroeconomic mechanisms which will be activated in the course 
of completing the common market. Again, the source is from the Cecchini Report (page 100).
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The graph is self explanatory, and by following the arrows, one can better understand the EC's 
reasons for completing the internal market. This graph summarizes several of the benefits which 
we outlined in Part III.
These macroeconomic effects were developed by the Cecchini team based on 
microeconomic figures. These absolute figures can be examined in the following graph, taken 
from The European File,The Big European Market, from the Commission of the European 
Communities (page 3).
Potential Gains from the Completion of the European Internal Market
in MSo ai «IIC U . it 1MS vato. fir t o  13 tm m tto f Mmtor Su m  *
I f f u t s  i f  im ifta to tf  
M  nfcciftt m tH km q  of 
tmifftil t v « f t t t m  o r* 
mu iufr prtfHi
I"
M l  fn n  oi#)iMft| 
tcoftomm i f  m il
min Ml
i
O ftto fn m to  
M i l  if  btm & i 
ifftfim f U U o
-------- —1
Oiiftifrifti t o  
nmmrd of fcimirt 
•ffmiftl mnnl inM iift
T i t o t u y i i M i f f t i
34
We have Made the distinction between a customs union (the European Community since 
1968) and a common market (the European Community 1992). A customs union is a free-trade 
area with a common external tariff schedule. The union members must agree on both the height 
o f the common tariff and the distribution o f the tariff proceeds. A common market is a customs 
union whose members allow, in addition, free movement among them of all factors of 
production32. In addition to that we have made the benefits of the common market visible 
graphically, to bring together the components o f the previous chapters in a simple economic 
analysis, to make the effects o f a common market and integration in general more clear to the 
reader. This part is the conclusion o f the general plans o f the European Community for 1992. 
In Part V we will focus on one country, Germany, and see the effects o f common market 
integration on that country in light o f current reunification plans.
32Chacholiades, 242.
P art V: The G erm an C oncentration
Earlier, we examined the effects o f integration on the European Community as a whole. 
Now, the focus will become slightly more fine-tuned. This section will review slightly the 
history o f Germany, the expected effects of 1992 on this country, and of course the way in which 
reunification between the two Germanics will affect the internal market problem. The dynamic 
nature o f this final analysis makes it difficult to include any definite economic models, so 
included in this section will be synopses o f expert opinions and summaries of recent publications.
The brief historical summary will simply explain how the Federal Republic o f Germany 
reached its status as an economic power.
After the Industrial Revolution and the development of the German “Zollverein" (custom? 
union between German states), Germany, in 1871, reached a political union. This political union 
was known as “Deutsches Reich.” The “Zollverein" (1819-1833) was proof that the abolition 
of trade barriers can result in a substantial economic growth and lead to higher standards of living 
and integration.
The period between 1871 and 1913 was a  period o f massive economic growth for 
Germany. The growth in exports tell all. In 1872 Germany exported $300 million worth of 
goods. This figure grew to $2.3 billion by 1913**. Germany became a nuyor competitor o f the 
economic powerhouse o f England. Germany began taking away markets from England. World 
War I then interrupted this surge o f economic growth in Germany. The years between 1918 and 
1939 were characterized by inflation in Germany. This was due partly to the Versailles Treaty
-” Dr. W erner Baer, lecture, The Rise o f Germany as an Economic Power. 13 Feb., 1990
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which brought an end to World War I but called for the payment of 132 million Marks for 
reparation. The result was a huge amount of mark printing which increased the money supply 
and caused inflation. American capital flowed into Germany. Germany, like many other 
countries became dependent on this American capital for survival.Of course, after the American 
decrease in GNP by 1/3 in 1933, Germany, like the rest o f the world was hard hit by the 
depression.
H itler's Nazi regime used the depressed economic situation and hyperinflation to motivate 
Germany for World War II. Germany was left divided into four zones of occupation which, in 
1949, formed the two German states. After World War II and the development of the Bretton- 
Woods System in 1944, Germany was on the road to recovery, as was the rest of Europe. A 
new West German government elected its first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer in 1949.
By 1937, the formation of the European Economic Community decreased trade hindrances 
and by 1968 developed the customs union with the Community of 6. The Federal Republic of 
Germany was operating with a strong currency and trade surplus. This growth continued 
throughout the 1980's. 1989 saw ihe collapse of the Communist Party in East Germany. This 
issue will be discussed later, but first we will look at some effects o f 1992 common market plans 
on West Germany alone.
To analyze the expected effects of 1992 on West Germany, we will return to the Cecchini 
Report and a Commerzbank trade report from 1988.
The Commerzbank trade report compared 1992 with the EC customs union established 
in 1968. Before 1938 only 38% o f German exports were distributed to other EC Member States
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and today that figure has risen to 33%. Market integration should lead to a comparable 
expansion in trade. The report prepared by Paolo Cecchini for the ET Commission declared that 
West Germany could look forward to price falls up to 32% in pharmaceuticals and up to 39% 
in specific areas of telecommunication. It is estimated that German coal buyers will only be 
paying half o f the amount they now do. Decreases in consumer credit and car insurance are also 
expected^.
As Rolf E. Breuer.of tl e Deutsche Bank, reports, the German stock markets should r e p  
the benefits of all the concentrations, takeovers, mergers and privatizations as companies raise 
capital to position themselves for \9 9 2 JS.
This speculation undoubtedly has caused a flow of foreign investors to the German stock 
markets. The strength o f the Mark and the abundance o f certain industry and services in 
Germany will make foreign competitors less likely to move into Germany in 1992 due to obvious 
stiff competition and high prices relative to other EC Member States. Examples of overly 
abundant sectors are retail insurance and banking services. These abundant sectors will 
undoubtedly branch out and expand through Europe. In the Ricardian philosophy, however, there 
is another side to this. The industrial insurance and wholesale banking will become heavily 
competitive in Germany as these types o f businesses are in short supply. In response to this type 
of activity throughout Europe, growth will be through acquisition, as has already been proven
^-G erm any, Acquiring the Strength,” ( Euromonev. Special Supplement, 1988)48-31. 
J5Euromoney. 48.
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through current mergers and acquisitions in light o f the happenings in 1992. A sound German 
example is Deutsche Bank, with its recent purchase of Italy's Banca d ' America d 'ltalia (12/86), 
and the acquisition o f 39% of the Spanish Bank, Banco Commercial Transatlantico. This 
example o f mergers and acquisitions in the banking area leaves smaller banks weakened. 
Therefore several German co-operative banks are now also calling for mergers to strengthen their 
positions as well**
Certainly, the gains o f Europe 1992 for Germany sound promising. At least theoretically 
most would agree that the integration would hopefully cause a balance between Germany and the 
rest of the Community that will increase welfare for all. The problems may be in the competition 
area however. The strong front-runners of the German powerhouse will be more able to control 
huge EC markets. The EC 's policies on competition are and will remain under close scrutiny 
and for good reason. But all o f these facts were drawn up and reported before the eventful 
autumn of 1989 when the wall in Berlin came crashing down, and the communist governments 
were ousted in East Germany.
In November o f 1989 the outflow of East German citizens reached a point of such 
intensity that the Berlin Wall was opened up. Freedom of movement between the east and the 
west was, after more than four decades, restored. The logic from the Soviet dominated East was 
ironic. The hope was that opening the Wall would help to keep citizens inside. Reunification 
seemed doubtful. As East Germans continued to flow into West Germany at approximately 2,000 
per day, it was obvious that the oppressed eastern Germans were calling for much more than an
” Euromonev. 41-43.
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open door between the East and the West. The whispers about reunification became normal 
conversation.
The support from abroad was also strong. The Big Four (United States, United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union) seemingly untied the knots o f the Potsdam Conference when they 
issued a  statement o f support for the reunification. The four agreed to help a  reunited Germany 
to establish its new world policies and answer thorny political questions, after the two Germanies 
united internally. The main “thorny political questions” we will concentrate on are:
—Will a reunited Germany stay in NATO?
—Will a reunited Germany stay in the EC?
By February o f 1990 it was fully obvious that there was little or nothing Germanies' 
frightened neighbors could do tn order to slow down the process o f reunification'77. This element 
of fear, although not unfounded, is somewhat outdated.
At least for the immediate future, it seems Germany will remain in NATO. It is quite 
obvious, by recent negotiations that a  united Germany indeed will remain in NATO, at least 
initially.
After a weekend of crucial talks between President Bush and West German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, the Wall Street Journal reported on February 26, 1990 (p.AT) that a unified 
Germany should be a full member o f the Western military alliance. At a news conference on the 
same day the Wall Street Journal quoted President Bush to say the following:
We share a  common belief that a unified Germany should remain a  full member o f the
J7“The Rise o f the New Europe," ( U.S. News and W orld Report. February 26, 1990)26.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including participation in its military
structure......U .S. military forces should remain stationed in a united Germany and
elsewhere in Europe as a continuing guaran ty  of stability.
Mr. Kohl however was far less explicit. He alluded to a European peace order sometime in the 
future.
It seems that for the immediate future, Germany (united) will remain in NATO. The 
future of this organization, however, remains in the hands o f fate. The need for such an 
organization depends upon future developments in eastern Europe.
The focus on reunification in respect to this thesis is more on the economic side and how 
unification will affect the EC 's integration plans for 1992.
When reunification of Germany became an accepted occurrence in Europe, many 
wondered whether or not a united Germany would remain in the European Community. As 
reported by the editorial staff of the Wall Street Journal on March 2, 1990:
...there seems to be general agreement in the West that a united Germany will be 
democratic, prosperous, and firmly bound to the European Community.
From the analytical framework o f Part IV, it is obvious that economic integration should 
be beneficial to all countries involved in the long run. These concepts apply to Germany, 
whether it is reunited o r not. The changes would not be within the analytical framework 
discussed earlier but rather within a united Germany and the strength the country would have as 
an economic entity. It is clear that W est Germany will have to pour huge amounts of capital 
into its eastern counterpart, weakening the present economic power o f W est Germany.
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Perhaps the greatest question is to what extent German unification will be complete and 
how quickly this process will occur. How quickly will a united Germany form in order to adapt 
to the policy changes occurring under the White Paper plans? We only have indicators to work 
with. One indicator is o f course the recent election o f March 18, 1990 in East Germany which 
seemed to ensure a quick road to unification.
On March 18, 1990 the East Germans elected Lothar de Maiziere, and his part), the 
Christian Democrats, forming an alliance with the equivalent party of Helmut Kohl in the West. 
Many experts agree that this conservative alliance will be a key to quick reunification. After the 
elections Helmut Kohl announced that the elections for a unified Germany will probably occur 
in 1991"
But will this be enough time for a unified Germany to be prepared for a common market 
by 1992? One should tot be alarmed by the date o f 1991 for unified elections because the plans 
for immediate policy changes and aid from West Germany are occurring now. The two 
Germanies are we'l on the way to reunification. Now we will change our focus to the steps the 
two countries are making in order to reunify and how reunification processes will affect the 
economic states o f East and West Germany.
Key questions which must be addressed are the following: How is the European 
Community reacting to unification plans for the two Germanies? What does West Germany plan 
to do now? How will East Germany be affected by the unification?
To begin with, the EC has already begun to clear the way for a united Germany. A Wall
" “The Next Step", Wall Street Journal. March 20, 1990, A12.
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Street Journal Staff Reporter wrote on Feb. 9 , 1990 (Page A7) that the European Community 
has already begun to map a strategy for the inclusion o f East Germany in the EC. Martin 
Bangemann, a  former West German economics minister leads a special group on the European 
Com munity's Commission to study the effects of German unification on common market plans. 
Although specifics were not given in the article referred to above, it was stated that German 
reunification would not pose great problems for the EC 's own plans for economic integration. 
The group agreed reportedly that both EC and German integration "could be achieved together. ”
But what kind o f tasks does this leave for the West? Already West Germany has passed 
6.9 billion Deutsche Marks to East Germany, much funded by new borrowing. Undoubtedly this 
h is been the cause for much speculation as investors continue to decrease capital flow to West 
German markets. Following if a summary of expectr' effects o f continued West German support 
for East Germany as declared in a report by the Wall Street Journal on March 20, 1990 (page 
A13).
East Germany will soon adopt West German tax policies. After doing so, it is expected 
that East Germany will plunge into a  deficit o f roughly DM SO billion because they currently tax 
companies up to 90%. Bonn could help fund this by borrowing, increasing taxes and decreasing 
government spending. All of these things would decrease German welfare in the West.
Deutsche Bank representatives said that rising prices are unavoidable. At least in the short 
run (estimated 2-3 yean) West Germany will have to increase the money supply by 13% to meet 
the promised 1:1 exchange ratio on certain East German savings. This increase will cause 
inflation. The way a government can control this is through monetary policy. Increasing interest
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rates could decrease inflation, as they are always directly related. But increasing interest rates 
could cause a  reduction in private sector spending. The report states that a certain amount of 
inflation is inevitable.
The development o f industry in the east will also need to be partially funded by die West 
to be sure that east German firms do not close due to lack o f working capital.
The impact of monetary union will have huge effects in the short run on West German 
welfare as can be construed by the previous summary. On top o f the capital flow to the east, the 
West is faced with the need to aid productivity. The demand for western products in the East 
will no doubt put a  huge strain on small eastern firms and wages.
So the immediate effects may seem disheartening. West Germany will experience inflation 
and decreased economic growth. This decrease in growth will no doubt lessen all o f the positive 
effects o f a strong German economy reacting to plans for 1992. East Germans also will 
experience huge debts and unemployment in the short run. But it is the long term effects which 
the Germans focus upon. A reunited Germany will be a strong force in the future. The 
European Community too will benefit in 1992 when, hopefully, the common market will be 
complete. A united Germany offers more new markets to EC industry.
Certainly the plans t o  unification are difficult now to analyse. As the events occur before 
our eyes, the entire world watches in anticipation o f a  reunited German nation. Some are 
excited, others are frightened, but it seems that all accept the feet that the quick changes 
happening are irreversible, setting the stage t o  an exciting future t o  the two Germanics and the 
European Community.
Conclusion
The European Community is currently working toward a common market in an attempt 
to make Europe a competitive entity on world markets. Through the removal o f physical, 
technical, and fiscal barriers, this move toward internal market completion is irreversible. 
Europe is progressively moving forward as the test o f the world watches with anticipation.
My attempts in this thesis were to analyze and clarify the reasons behind this move toward 
integration. Part I was an overview of the history o f the European Community. The main point 
here was that economic integration is not a new goal. Nobody suddenly decided in 1985 to build 
a Fortress Europe. Through examination o f the 1957 Treaty o f Rome in Part I, we realize that 
integration was a goal o f the past, clouded over by economic complications, especially during the 
1970's.
Part II ties the history o f Part I in to the outlined plans for progressive unification as 
examined through the W hite Paper.
Part III is a  summary of the progression since 1985 and clearly points out the fact that the 
EC is quite serious about these plans. The opinions outlined in Part HI are clearly only a few 
of the many which circulate among experts today. The way these specific opinions were chosen 
was through research o f many opinions, pulling out the most frequently named.
Part IV is an analytical framework using economic definitions and some simple graphs 
to give an objective approach to the possible benefits from economic integration.
Finally, Part V is the overview o f current movements in Bast and W est Germany. The 
attempt in this section was to analyze current opinions and expected e ffe c t o f German
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reunification. It must be stressed again that such analyses are much more easily made in 
hindsight! The main point o f this section was o f course that the short term effects of a united 
Germany may seem negative, but it is the long term expectations which both Germanies and the 
EC now focus on.
The thesis in general is a  blend of history, opinions, and simple economics. The purpose 
o f this thesis was to inform the reader, on a thorough, yet practical level, about the European 
Community, the White Paper plans, current analyses, and economic effects of integration, 
allowing the reader to form a broad picture o f what is happening in the European Community 
today. Certainly, this information is practical and dynamic. The nature o f the information 
provided in itself is a  lesson for all; we are moving more and more toward a global economy, 
eastern Europe is making huge advances to integrate into this economy, and nobody anywhere 
can afford to ignore the huge effects these movements will have in setting the stage for an 
exciting future.
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